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 1 
PLURAL VISION: INTERNATIONAL LAW SEEN 
THROUGH THE VARIED LENSES OF DOMESTIC 
IMPLEMENTATION 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
The essays collected in this volume have evolved from 
papers presented at a conference on “International Law in the 
Domestic Context” held at the Valparaiso University School of 
Law in April 2009.  To some extent, the conference was a response 
to the questions raised by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Medellín v. Texas1 and our collective curiosity about how other 
states deal with tensions between international obligations and 
overlapping regimes of national law.   
In Medellín, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Texas was 
entitled to ignore a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the Avena case.2   The Court thus permitted Texas to proceed 
with the execution of a Mexican national who had not been given 
timely notice of his right of consular notification and consultation 
in violation of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.3  This ruling seemed to be in 
                                                 
∗
 Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. The Author is grateful to: 
Professor Penelope Andrews for her assistance in helping to organize the 
conference at which the papers collected here were originally presented; to the 
Law School for its institutional support and to its staff for their invaluable 
logistical and organizational support; and to the Law Review editors both for 
their willingness to see the papers through to publication and for their efforts in 
achieving that goal. 
1
 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008). 
2
 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 
31). 
3
 Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77,  T.I.A.S. no. 6820.  See id., Art. 
36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal defendant, 
“the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the 
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of 
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is 
detained in any other manner”).  The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its 
Article 36 obligations with respect to Avena and other Mexican nationals, 
including Medellín.  See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71-72, ¶ 153 (finding, by a vote 
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tension with two iconic documents setting out the relationship of 
international law and domestic law in the United States.  First, the 
Medellín decision is hard to square with the U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that treaties shall be “supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”4   In addition, Medellín seems at odds 
with the famous dictum from The Paquete Habana: “International 
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as 
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their 
determination.”5   
Although it is tempting to conclude that Medellín was 
wrongly decided, the reality is that our constitutional tradition 
speaks with many voices on the subject of the relationship between 
domestic and international law.  In order to gain a broader 
perspective on that relationship, we invited experts on foreign law 
to introduce us to the way other states attempt to reconcile 
international commitments and the domestic constitutional order. 
Hans Kelsen’s monism offers a nifty solution to the 
problem of the status of international law as domestic law.  Kelsen 
believed that there must be only one law if there is to be law at all 
and thus that domestic law and  international law must be part of 
one normative system.  As Kelsen explained in 1934, his “pure 
theory” of law recognized “that a continuous sequence of legal 
structures, gradually merging into one another, leads from the 
universal legal community of international law, encompassing all 
states, to the legal communities incorporated into the state.”6 
                                                                                                             
of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations under 
Article 36(1) of the VCCR). 
4
 U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2. 
5
 20 S.Ct. 290, 299 (1900). 
6
 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124 
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, trans. 1992). 
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Kelsen’s approach to the relation of international law and 
domestic law makes sense.  If domestic law were not subordinated 
to international law but could trump it, states would routinely 
demand to be excused from their international obligations based on 
superior domestic law.  Moreover, from Kelsen’s perspective, as a 
factual matter, international law is higher law than domestic law, 
because it is only by virtue of the recognition of state governments, 
as a matter of international law, that domestic law preserves its 
monopoly on the domestic use of force.7  The internationally 
recognized legitimacy of state government is what gives that 
government’s regulations the force of law rather than of naked 
power. 
There is, however, a practical impediment to Kelsen’s 
monism.  Even in a monist world, there must be a legal process 
whereby international law is operationalized as a part of domestic 
law.  Even if we accept that international law is supreme law and 
should take precedence over any contrary domestic law, there must 
still be a mechanism assuring that supremacy.  As Kelsen 
acknowledges, state law does not cease to be valid law just because 
it contradicts international law until some adjudicatory body strikes 
down or refuses to enforce the state law to the extent of its 
inconsistency with the state’s international obligations.8  And so, 
even from a monist perspective, we need a mechanism for securing 
the orderly implementation of international law in the domestic 
order. 
But the monist perspective is not the only perspective.  In 
Commonwealth countries, for example, the dualist approach 
prevails.9  International law is not a part of the domestic law unless 
                                                 
7
 See id. at 120 (contending that a state only has lawmaking authority 
because international law empowers states to make law). 
8
 See id. at 118 (noting that even an unconstitutional statute remains a valid 
statute until overturned by a legal act). 
9
 See Dianne Otto, Protecting Human Rights and Countering Terrorism: 
Australia’s Contraditory Approaches to Implementing Its International Legal 
Obligations, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___, ___ [manuscript at 1] (2010) (noting that that 
Australia has adopted a dualist approach); Gib van Ert, Dubious Dualism: The 
Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010) (noting 
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implemented through national legislation.  It is clear from the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that the Framers 
intended to break with the Commonwealth approach.  Having 
experienced the inconveniences and embarrassments associated 
with having the governments of the Colonies ignore the 
international obligations of the national government under the 
Articles of Confederation, the Framers made treaties Supreme Law 
of the Land, and specified that treaty law would trump state law 
and that state courts must give effect to U.S. treaty commitments.10  
Customary international law has likewise been regarded as “a part 
of our law” since at least the Paquete Habana, but in the post-Erie 
world, but as Gwynne Skinner explores in her contribution to this 
volume,11 it is very difficult to identify exactly what part of our 
law it is.12   
While our constitutional design looks remarkably monist, 
that design is counterbalanced by the judicially-created doctrine of 
self-execution, according to which treaties are only automatically a 
                                                                                                             
that because English law does not repose law-making authority in the King, 
treaties can only become domestic law through a legislative act). 
10
 See D.A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín & Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 
414-16 (2009) (reviewing statements of the Framers regarding the purpose of 
the Supremacy Clause). 
11
 See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common 
Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).  
12
 See Curtis Bradley, et al., Sosa, Customary International Law and the 
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (2007) (arguing that 
after Erie, courts can implement rules of customary international law “only in 
accordance with the requirements and limitations of post-Erie federal common 
law”); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 
815, 821 (1997) (criticizing what they characterize as the “recent ascendancy” of 
customary international law as federal common law).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to adopt this “critique of the ‘modern position.’”  See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (ruling that Erie does not prevent federal courts 
from recognizing substantive rules arising out of customary international law).  
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, endorsing Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s position.  See id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that 
federal courts have no power to recognize causes of action arising under 
customary international law). 
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part of domestic law when they do not contemplate the need for 
legislative enactment.13  The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín 
clearly rejects any presumption that treaties are self-executing.  On 
one reading of Medellín, treaties that have domestic ramifications 
require congressional implementing legislation, unless they make 
clear on their face the parties’ intentions that they be non-self-
executing.14   
This doctrine of non-self-executing treaties may well be 
inconsistent with the plain, textual meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause, and with the express views of the Framers regarding the 
purpose of the Supremacy Clause.  However, the monist view may 
be inconsistent with other aspects of the constitutional design.  As 
others have pointed out, our Constitution reposes the legislative 
power in Congress.15  Permitting legislation by treaty would 
bypass the House of Representatives, which seems inconsistent 
                                                 
13
 See United States v. Perchemen, 7 Pet. 51, 88-89 (1833) (finding a treaty 
self-executing where it does not stipulate to the need for some future legislative 
act). 
14
 See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 (requiring stipulations in the treaty itself 
that its provisions require no legislative enactment); see also See David J. 
Bederman, Medellín's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 529, 529 (2008) (noting that scholarly attention regarding the Medellín 
opinion had focused on “the Court's supposed ruling as to the presumptive non-
self-execution of international agreements entered into by the United States”); 
Julian G. Ku, Medellín's Clear Statement Rule: A Solution for International 
Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 615 (2008) (acknowledging that 
Medellín might well be criticized for “departing from existing understandings of 
the non-self-execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement 
requirement”); Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 570 (2008) 
(noting several statements in the majority opinion suggesting that treaties are 
presumptively non-self-executing). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, 
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 541 
(2008) (suggesting that Medellín is best understood as requiring a treaty-by-
treaty approach to the question of self-execution without resort to a general 
presumption). 
15
 See U.S. const., Art I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers in “a Congress of 
the United States”). 
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with the constitutional design.16  Moreover, since bills that raise 
revenue must originate in the House of Representatives,17 it is hard 
to see how a self-executing treaty that required expenditures could 
in fact be implemented without the support of both Houses of 
Congress.  Similarly, if the United States were to sign on to an 
international agreement that created new international crimes, 
given the post-Erie absence of general federal common law, such 
crimes could not become part of our domestic law without some 
sort of legislative enactment.   
Despite the monist overtones of the Supremacy Clause, as a 
product of our constitutional history, the United States has a strong 
dualist tradition as well.  This tradition has recently been embodied 
in a school of thought that I will call “sovereigntist,” because its 
proponents regard state sovereignty as the fountainhead from 
which all law must derive.18  Soveigntism, of very different types, 
                                                 
16
 See JOHN YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 215-249 (2005) (arguing that the constitutional 
design calls for the President to take the lead in formulating foreign policy but 
vests domestic lawmaking power in Congress).  
17
 See U.S. const., Art I, § 7, ¶ 1. 
18
 See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: 
Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1113-14 (2008) (defining 
sovereigntism as “a position insistent on a nation's right to define and delineate 
its own lawmaking”) Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) 
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 654 & n. 16 (2002) (characterizing 
sovereigntism as “grounded in a general skepticism of international law and 
international lawmaking processes”).  Leading sovereigntists include academics 
such as Jeremy Rabkin, Curtis Bradley and Julian Ku, government officials such 
as John Bolton and people who have served as both scholars and government 
officials, such as John Yoo and Jack Goldsmith.  Examples of scholarship 
espousing a sovereigntist position include JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND 
PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); 
JEREMY RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE 
FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS  
(1998); Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural 
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. 
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New 
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); John R. Bolton, 
Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000).  
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is represented in this volume, in the contributions of Robert 
Blomquist19 and Richard Stith.20  For Professor Blomquist, 
international law poses a threat to the exercise of executive 
authority to conduct U.S. foreign affairs, an authority that he 
believes resides uniquely in the President.21  Professor Stith is an 
unusual type of sovereigntist, in that he is not particularly 
interested in the protection of U.S. sovereignty.  His sympathies lie 
more with weaker states whose unique and diverse legal, social 
and cultural norms are in danger of being subsumed within the 
homogeneity of the new world religion, international human rights 
law.22 
Initially it seems, supporters of national sovereignty and 
independence should have no strong objection to the supremacy of 
international law, since international law is based on consent, at 
least in theory.23  In reality, there are elements of international law 
                                                                                                             
As Julian Ku points out, at least some sovereigntists object to the label.  See 
Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties 
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319, 342 & n. 121 (2005) (contending that 
people characterized as “sovereigntists” are more interested in a  critique of the 
“internationalist” conception of international law than in developing a pro-
sovereignty ideology).  
19
 Robert Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security 
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010).  
20
 Richard Stith, If Dorothy Hadn’t Had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s 
Curtain: The Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. 
REV. ___ (2010). 
21
 See Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security 
Presiprudence, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 12] (arguing that courts 
should grant the President “wide latitude” in reconciling national security and 
liberty).  
22
 See Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ 
[manuscript at 3] (characterizing international human rights law as a new world 
religion in which forces of international domination are met on the domestic side 
– at least in weaker states only by forces of surrender); id at [manuscript at 4] 
(sympathetically citing a newspaper ad denouncing the World Trade 
Organization for working to “undermine the constitutional rights of sovereign 
nations”). 
23
 See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 115, 141 (2005) (“It is commonly observed that international law 
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that do not conform to the theory, including jus cogens norms,24 
customary norms when applied to new states that did not exist at 
the time of the norms’ formation,25 and new international criminal 
tribunals that could exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of states 
that have not consented to such jurisdiction.26  As Professor Stith’s 
paper highlights, international norms and institutions sometimes 
purport to be law whether or not they are endowed with the indicia 
of legitimacy identified by Thomas Franck – right process and 
substantive fairness.27  Moreover, they might exercise an 
imbalanced compliance pull28 on states powerless to resist the 
powerful states that stand behind international legal norms (and 
international economic assistance programs) while permitting 
themselves to ignore such norms when they prove inconvenient.29 
                                                                                                             
cannot bind states without their consent, and notions of consent are often said to 
be the basis for [customary international law].”). 
24
 See Laurence R. Hilfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 
U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 89 (2008) (noting that when international adjudicatory bodies 
recognize the peremptory status of legal norms, they do not require evidence of 
state consent before finding states bound). 
25
 Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. at 
72-74 (offering a rational choice model to permit new states to object to 
customary international law rules at the time of the states’ formation). 
26
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12 (1998), 37 ILM 
999. 
27
 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
7-8 (1996) (arguing that the legitimacy of legal rules turns on the processes 
through which they are adopted and on the rules’ substantive fairness from the 
perspective of distributive justice). 
28
 “Compliance pull” is Thomas Franck’s name for the “inherent pull 
power” toward compliance that legal norms exercise and which Franck views as 
an “index of legitimacy.”  Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International 
System, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 (1998). 
29
 See Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___  
[manuscript at 1-2] (contrasting U.S. dualism and superpower status which 
preserve a democratic choice that is unavailable in countries such as Argentina 
and Mexico where international law is directly effective and supreme). 
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Given the tensions in our constitutional design, it is not 
surprising that the domestic implementation of international 
obligations gives rise to certain difficulties.  However, as the 
papers collected in this volume indicate, in its struggles with this 
particular issue, the United States is, for once, anything but 
exceptional.  Nonetheless, there are aspects of the law of the 
United States that are at least idiosyncratic.  This volume sheds 
new light on those idiosyncrasies while also exploring the 
difficulties of reconciling international obligations and the 
domestic legal order. 
The essays collected here were presented in three separate 
panels during the conference.  The organization of the volume 
follows the same organizational principle.  The first three papers 
thus focus on questions relating to the implementation of 
international human rights as domestic law.  The two papers that 
follow address issues relating to international obligations and 
national security law.  The final section, which comprises four 
papers, provides a comparative perspective on how other 
international law is introduced into the domestic legal systems of 
Australia, Canada, China and the United Kingdom. 
* 
*            * 
Our first three papers address the difficulties that the 
United States and other countries face in the implementation of 
human rights law as domestic law.  One hurdle to U.S. 
participation in international legal regimes is our federalism, 
because as Medellín illustrates, the federal government cannot 
always compel the states to abide by international obligations 
taken on by the federal government.30  Paul Finkelman’s paper 
                                                 
30
 See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (finding that because none of the treaties 
at issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing 
legislation and that no such legislation exists, and finding that a decision by the 
International Court of Justice does not create binding federal law that could 
overcome the state bar to successive habeas petitions, Texas may proceed with 
the execution of Medellín notwithstanding the fact that such an execution would 
place the United States in violation of its international obligations). 
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reminds us that in the ante-bellum period, “American states treated 
each other as ‘foreign entities’” and “often refused to recognize 
and give comity to the laws of other states.”31  Moreover, Professor 
Finkelman cites to both the Alien Tort Statute32 and to the frequent 
citation to foreign law in early U.S. cases as evidence that 
international and foreign law have always been a part of our law.33   
But Professor Finkelman’s more surprising argument is that 
in the ante-bellum period, U.S. the several states regarded the laws 
of other U.S. states no differently from the way they regarded the 
law of foreign states.  In that context, the U.S. Supreme Court 
often resorted to international law concepts to settle conflicts 
among states or between citizens of separate states.34  Professor 
Finkelman’s contribution also illustrates how race was often at the 
center of the development of U.S. doctrines relating to inter-state 
comity and choice of law. 
The United States’ unique Alien Tort Statute is another 
ingredient of U.S. law that renders idiosyncratic the U.S approach 
to problem of international law as a part of the domestic order.   
The Alien Tort Statute has been at the center of litigation that has 
attempted – through the disorderly and ad hoc process that is the 
stuff of common law adjudication – to specify the status of 
customary international law within our domestic legal order.35  As 
                                                 
31
 Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 
VAL. L. REV. ___ (2010). 
32
 28 U.S.C.  § 1350. 
33
 Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. 
L. REV at ___ [manuscript at 2]. 
34
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 6]. 
35
 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (addressing 
Alien Tort Statute claim brought by a Mexican national alleging unlawful 
detention in Mexico by a Mexican national); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting Alien Tort Statute claim by survivors of 
a terror attack perpetrated by foreign nationals in Israel); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing Alien Tort Statute claim brought by a 
Paraguayan national whose brother had been tortured and killed by Paraguayan 
police). 
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Professor Skinner points out, scholars are divided into two camps – 
the modernist and revisionist positions – on the issue.36 
Professor Skinner intervenes forcefully in this debate with 
an essay that consults 18th and 19th century sources of law.  
Pinpointing the status of customary international law turns out to 
be a difficult task because, although the Supreme Court has stated 
that U.S. law “recognized” what then was called the “Law of 
Nations” at the time of the Founding,37 it was not recognized as 
part of general federal common law at the time because that body 
of law did not emerge until later in the 19th century.38  While 
Professor Skinner notes that there are strong arguments on either 
side of the academic debate regarding whether or not customary 
international law was part of the law of the United States for the 
purposes of Article III of the Constitution, she concludes that the 
contemporary disagreement reflects similar disagreements that 
raged throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.  In fact, she argues, 
that the debate over the status of customary international law was a 
product of larger debates regarding the relationship of the federal 
government and the states within our federal system.39 
Professor Skinner nonetheless argues that customary 
international law – or at least some aspects of it are included in the 
“laws of the United States” for the purposes of creating federal 
jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and that 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 also grants federal courts jurisdiction over federal 
common law doctrines that incorporate or recognize customary 
                                                 
36
 See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common 
Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ [manuscript at 6-
10] (identifying modernists as those who believe that federal law incorporates 
customary international law either in whole or in part and revisionists as those 
who as those who believe that, post-Erie, federal incorporation of custom 
requires a legislative act).  
37
 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
38
 Skinner, Customary International Law,  44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ 
[manuscript at 10].  
39
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 12-14]. 
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international law.40  She thus navigates a middle ground between 
the modern and revisionist positions on the status of customary 
international law as “part of our law,” arguing that only customary 
rules “recognized” under general federal common law can give rise 
to claims in federal courts.41 
While these first two contributions focus on the domestic 
mechanisms, such as constitutional principles, comity or the Alient 
Tort Statute, for recognizing international human rights law or 
humanitarian principles as part of our law, Professor Stith’s paper 
introduces a stirring antidote to what might be described as 
international human rights law triumphalism.  Compared with 
developing nations forced to surrender to the new prophets of the 
new world religion, as Professor Stith describes them, the United 
States is rather well-defended when it comes to resisting the 
universalizing impulses of international law.  Hence, the original 
panel’s concern with how best to implement international human 
rights law in the domestic context suggests an “American 
paochialism.”42  Professor Stith suggests that such resistance may 
be a necessary means of preserving a fruitful and blessed diversity, 
not only in the U.S., but globally. 
Professor Stith problematizes the international human 
rights movement on a number of levels, but his most sweeping 
argument is that rights are, by their very nature, anti-democratic.43  
But Professor Stith’s real concern is with positive rights; that is, 
rights that the state has a positive duty to protect, as opposed to 
negative rights, which require only that the state leave us alone.44  
The problems that Professor Stith identifies are best represented in 
General Comment 15 on the right to water, which the Committee 
                                                 
40
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 18-19]. 
41
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 26-27]. 
42
 Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ 
[manuscript at 1]. 
43
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 4]. 
44
 Id. at ___ [manuscript at 8]. 
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights promulgated in 2002.45  
Professor Stith characterizes the Committee as a non-
representative body of non-lawyers that has promulgated a 
document that seeks through legal language to bind states to 
protect a positive “right” to water that is not expressly mentioned 
in any international agreement.  The Committee’s Comment is 
effective, says Professor Stith, not because it is backed up by the 
threat of force but because it is backed up with “guilt and shame 
for those who refuse to comply.”46  For Professor Stith, the 
oracular quality of the pronouncements of international bodies 
creates dynamics more akin to religious than to legal discourse.47 
Professor Stith raises significant and familiar objections 
relating to international law’s notorious “democracy deficit.”   In 
considering how to address those objections, it is important to note, 
especially in the context of a volume on the domestic 
implementation of international law that those who decry the 
democracy deficit in international law greatly exaggerate the extent 
to which international law is distinct from domestic law in this 
respect.   
At least within the United States, people regard 
international law with suspicion for the same reason they are wary 
of (or think they are wary of) “activist judges.”  They think of 
courts and of international law as elite (or at least non-populist), 
unaccountable because unelected (although state courts now are 
largely elected by people who have no idea who they are voting 
for) and alien.  International law is alien for obvious reasons; 
courts are alien because they use a technical jargon and decide 
                                                 
45
 EC.12/2002/11, 20 Jan. 2003, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FIL
E/G0340229.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
46
 Stith, Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. L. REV. at ___ 
[manuscript at 9]. 
47
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cases on grounds other than the merits that are completely opaque 
to the non-lawyer.   
In fact, however, our supposedly democratically 
accountable branches of government are not much more so than 
are courts.  As far as our House of Representatives is concerned 
(the so-called “People’s House”), because of gerrymandering, it is 
far more accurate to say that our politicians choose their 
constituents than the other way ’round.48  And once they have 
chosen their districts, members of the House have to devote much 
of their two-year terms to securing re-election rather than to 
legislating.49  Things are better in the Senate, but only by degree, 
not by an order of magnitude, and their six-year terms render 
Senators only slightly more accountable than judges.50  Presidents 
may of course be turned out of office, but they are never turned out 
                                                 
48
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 Compare Judith Resnik, So Long, LEGAL AFFAIRS 20, 21 (July/August 
2005) (finding that the average tenure in office for federal judges who have 
retired in the last two decades has been about 24 years) with ROGER H. 
DAVIDSON, et al., CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS (2008) (finding that the average 
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of office for one bad decision in particular, while judges are often 
vilified for upholding laws that passed unnoticed when enacted by 
a legislature.51  In any case, the real power is not in passing 
legislation but in drafting it, and for the most part the people who 
do so are either unelected and unaccountable specialists within the 
executive branch, unelected and unaccountable legislative aids or 
unelected and unaccountable lobbyists. 
There is no doubt that international law faces challenges 
not only of democracy deficit but also of transparency.  But here 
again, international institutions are not qualitatively different from 
national institutions.  Because of the well-documented tendency of 
the executive branch to expand the scope of classified documents, 
there has been a huge increase in the portion of our executive 
branch which is completely inaccessible to the voting public.52  A 
much larger portion of it is technically accessible but in reality just 
as hidden because keeping tabs on specialized executive agencies 
is more than a full-time job.  Legislatures are no better of course, 
as they routinely pass important legislation without reading it.53  
This is inevitably true because of the sheer length of omnibus 
legislation and because of the byzantine amendment process that 
inevitably causes bills to morph and grow on their way to adoption. 
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Compared with our domestic political institutions 
international bodies may have a tremendous discursive advantage.  
Their deliberations may be private, at least in part, but there is 
always significant opportunity for public comment and criticism, 
and the reasoning underlying statements of international 
adjudicatory or treaty bodies, warts and all, is presented in public 
documents that are subject to criticism and resistance. 
Thus, expanding on Professor Stith’s critique of rights and 
of international human rights, we might pose the same sorts of 
questions with respect to the domestic legal order.  Domestic 
courts might very well view the Alien Tort Statute, that “legal 
Lohengrin”54 with the same sort of suspicion which we ordinarily 
reserve for foreign and international law.  While we are at it, we 
can look at other domestic institutions that touch on human rights 
and that are neither constitutional nor democratic in nature, such 
as: Presidential signing statements which can gut legislation 
seeking to force the executive to abide by international human 
rights instruments; the Totten doctrine and the state secrets 
privilege, which can shield the executive from liability even for 
constitutional violations provable through publicly-available 
evidence; sole executive and legislative-executive agreements, 
which account for over 90% of the United States’ international 
agreements and skirt the Senate’s constitutional treaty powers; and 
the reservations, understandings and declarations that the Senate 
attaches to the rare treaty submitted for its “advice and consent.” 
* 
*            * 
Our second set of papers addresses foreign affairs and 
national security concerns, and there we begin with a return to the 
subject of federalism, as explored in Michael Granne’s paper.55  
                                                 
54
 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J) 
(calling the Alien Tort Statute a legal Lohengrin because nobody knows 
“whence it came”). 
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 Michael Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign 
Affairs Preemption, 44 VAL. L. REV. __ (2010). 
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One of the interesting oddities of the Medellín case, to which I 
alluded earlier, is that it could be read as requiring the 
acquiescence of the federal government, represented strenuously 
by the executive branch, in a foreign policy decision made by a 
state court in Texas.56  Professor Granne notes that Medellín is just 
one in a long line of cases in which the courts have wrestled with 
the question of foreign affairs preemption.  In Professor Granne’s 
view, the courts have not articulated a principled approach to 
preemption in this area and the resulting caselaw does not appear 
to be internally consistent. 
Professor Granne argues that courts’ approaches have 
seeemd incoherent because courts fail to adequately appreciate that 
conflicts between state and federal interests in foreign affairs can 
be understood as inhabiting three different paradigms, each of 
which requires a different approach to the weighing of the state 
and federal interests implicated.  The first paradigm, for which 
Zschernig v. Miller57 is emblematic, is often called “dormant 
foreign affairs preemption,” in which federal law automatically 
displaces any state law that interferes with foreign affairs powers 
entrusted to the federal government alone.58  Second, we have what 
Professor Granne calls “obstacle preemption.”  This arises when 
state action presents an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
congressional goals.  The emblematic cases illustrating this 
paradigm are Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,59 in 
which the Supreme Court struck down at Massachusetts law that 
was at odds with congressional sanctions against the state of 
Burma (Myanmar), and American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi,60 in which the Supreme Court struck down 
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California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act.61  Finally, 
there may be cases where a Congressional statement of intent of 
preempt state law could be required.62 
Professor Granne applies recent scholarship differentiating 
between vertical and horizontal federalism in order to provide a 
more coherent basis for foreign affairs preemption.  Vertical 
federalism describes situations when federal uniformity concerns 
justify permitting federal law to trump state law.  Horizontal 
federalism describes situations in which there is a need to 
coordinate state activities, as in the area of environmental 
protection. While foreign affairs might seem like a classic case for 
vertical federalism, Professor Granne argues that elements of 
horizontal federalism also ought to inform foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine.63   
Some state actions implicate foreign affairs but do not 
create any significant tensions with federal control of foreign 
affairs.  Examples of such state actions include cultural and 
educational exchanges and trade agreements between individual 
states and foreign nations.  With respect to this category, Professor 
Granne’s model would require federal preemption only when 
specifically called for by federal statute or treaty.64  The second 
category is state policies, such as “buy American” statutes, which 
give rise to non-trivial interference with federal uniformity 
concerns in the area of free trade.  Here, Professor Granne argues, 
the obstacle preemption approach is appropriate.65  Finally, there 
are state statutes that single out some foreign government for 
sanction.  These statutes implicate both the uniformity concerns 
associated with vertical federalism and the coordination problems 
associated with horizontal federalism.  To such cases, Professor 
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Granne argues, the dormant foreign affairs preemption approach is 
best suited.66  Professor Granne’s paper thus offers an elegant 
solution that makes sense of a confusing tangle of related cases.   
The thread that unites our two papers that address national 
security issues is the question of the role of courts in adjudicating 
disputes relating to foreign affairs.  While Professor Granne 
develops a nuanced preemption doctrine that recognizes the 
competing interests of the several states and the branches of the 
federal government, Professor Blomquist focuses on the 
institutional competence of the executive branch and thus argues 
for judicial deference to the foreign affairs powers of the President, 
whom he characterizes as “the national security sentinel with vast, 
but not unlimited powers to protect the nation from hostile, 
potentially catastrophic, threats.”67  Because of the President’s 
vastly superior store of knowledge and expertise, Professor 
Blomquist argues that court’s should not question executive 
national security decisions “unless clearly necessary to 
counterbalance an indubitable violation of the text of the 
Constitution.”68  Professor Blomquist also stakes out a position 
against the use of foreign law as legal precedent, especially when a 
U.S. Court is reviewing the executive’s determinations relating to 
national security, a field for which Professor Blomquist has created 
a handy term, presiprudence.69   
Professor Blomquist’s position, opposing the use of foreign 
law is uncontroversial, and in fact Professor Blomquist cites to no 
case in which a U.S. court has ever relied on foreign law as 
precedent.70  The consequences of his position on presiprudence 
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with respect to international law are, by contrast, potentially 
explosive.  For example, Professor Blomquist follows Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule, who argues that the United States should 
only abide by its international obligations under the laws of war 
when the U.S. benefits from such compliance, taking into account 
the possible reputational costs of non-compliance.71  This position 
clearly informed the Department of Justice during the Bush 
administration, but it was rejected by that administration’s 
Department of State.72  This conflict between two agencies within 
the same executive branch complicates the logic of presiprudence 
and also, as I have argued elsewhere,73 renders dubious the 
executive branch’s claims to superior expertise in matters of 
foreign affairs.  If the President chooses the opinions of his highly 
politicized and in part non-expert Office of Legal Counsel over 
those of his highly professionalized legal advisors within the 
Department of State on matters of international law, the executive 
branch must abandon its argument that courts should defer to the 
executive branch’s superior expertise. 
* 
*            * 
Our final set of papers introduces us to the dynamic 
regarding the implementation of international law as domestic law 
in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and China.  In those 
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countries, as here, the picture is more complicated than the simple 
choice of monism or dualism might suggest.  But these cases 
contain insights into foreign practices that provide useful 
perspectives on our own.  For example the first contribution in this 
final set of four, from Jim Kennan,74 includes a discussion of 
judicial views of deference to the executive branch in national 
security cases, that provides a startling contrast to the position set 
out in Professor Blomquist’s essay. 
Mr. Kennan’s discussion of the case law from the United 
Kingdom culminates with some excerpts on the subject of 
deference to executive authority from the Belmarsh case, which 
was decided in the House of Lords in 2004.75  In rejecting 
sweeping claims to executive expertise in national security matters, 
the Law Lords referenced the skepticism “which has attached to 
intelligence assessment since the fiasco over Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction,” and suggested that such faulty assessments were 
to blame for the participation of the military forces of the United 
Kingdon in Iraq.76  They also declared that terrorism, while 
“hideous” and “serious,” does not pose an existential threat.  
Rather, the threat arises from our own responses to terror.77  Indian 
courts echo this view that courts must protect human rights even in 
times of national crisis.78  The Kantian dictum, fiat justicia ruat 
caelum, seems to have retained much of its original force. 
Turning to his native Australia, Jim Kennan notes that 
Australia has no constitutional protections of individual rights akin 
to our Bill of Rights, nor does it automatically incorporate 
international human rights obligations into domestic law.  Rather, 
Australia seems to have a canon of interpretation much like our 
own, that statutes should be construed to be consistent with 
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international obligations absent a clear statement to the contrary.79  
But unlike the United Kingdom, Australia is reluctant to address 
human rights concerns on any basis other than the common law.80  
Mr. Kennan’s conclusion is clear: the English approach is 
preferable.81  But his essay holds out hope that there may be hope 
for human rights in Australia.  It is to be found not in the common 
law, nor in the customary law of nations but in the common sense 
of Australian jurors willing “to stand back from the war on terror 
rhetoric which has so dominated public discussion since 2001.”82 
Dianne Otto’s piece picks up where Jim Kennan’s left off, 
acknowledging Australia’s insistence on protecting human rights 
only through domestic enactments.  But she then picks up on some 
of the themes of Richard Stith’s paper, although in a completely 
different register, expressing concern that Security Council 
resolutions aimed at countering international terrorism might give 
rise to a new hegemonic international law.83  Professor Otto tells 
what for U.S. lawyers is a fairly familiar narrative in which 
national pride in one’s own domestic protections of civil rights, 
coupled with distrust of judicial processes forms the basis for 
opposition to the implementation of international treaty 
obligations.84  In fact, Professor Otto suggests that the response of 
the conservative Howard government to criticisms of its human 
rights record was “reminiscent of US exceptionalist claims.”85  
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However, Professor Otto notes the contrast between 
Australia’s reluctance to implement international human rights 
protections and it “eagerness to implement its international legal 
obligations” relating to post-9/11 Security Council resolutions, 
especially Resolution 1373.86  This resolution was remarkable for 
the swiftness with which it was adopted and for its sweeping 
nature.  Unlike previous Security Council resolutions, Resolution 
1373 does not call for temporary measures addressing a specific 
threat to international peace and security.  Unfortunately, despite 
its legislative quality, Resolution 1373 bears the “opaqueness and 
exclusivity” that are the hallmark of executive enactments and of 
the Security Council’s protocols more generally.87  Pursuant to 
Resolution 1373, Australia enacted legislation creating enhanced 
police and surveillance powers modeled on the USA Patriot Act of 
2001.88  This is international law-making at its most muscular, and 
it is undertaken by a body that Professor Otto describes as 
“patently unrepresentative, un-consultative, and lacking in 
transparency and accountability.”89  
Despite her disappointment with Australia’s record on 
human rights and its willingness to toe the line when it comes to 
Security Council directives on national security issues, Professor 
Otto concludes by stressing the need for all states to recognize the 
universality of human rights.90  The problem is not that 
international law is brought into the domestic process but that this 
occurs through hegemonic law rather than through what she calls 
the “participatory international law-making processes” involving 
both states and civil society.91  
Gib van Ert’s contribution to our volume begins with a 
simple syllogism: Under Canadian law, only the executive can 
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make treaties and the executive cannot make law; therefore, 
treaties are not law.92  In principle, Canadian law does not suffer 
from the ambiguities that led to the Medellín case: all treaties 
require legislative implementation in order to be part of the 
Canadian domestic legal order.93  But Canada is not a pure dualist 
system; it too is a hybrid in which customary international law is 
directly incorporated into common law and in which judicial 
interpretation can give direct effect to treaties as well.94  In 
addition, in developing and interpreting domestic human rights 
norms, Canadian attorneys and courts are free to refer to – and 
even to rely on – legal norms that arise in foreign and international 
contexts.95  Moreover, Canadian courts would appear to be even 
less deferential to executive interpretations of international and 
treaty law than are their counterparts in the United Kingdom.96 
Mr. van Ert’s discussion of Canada’s incorporation 
doctrine, whereby rules of customary international law are directly 
incorporated into domestic law, is especially instructive.  Based on 
the academic uproar about the “modernist” and “revisionist” 
positions discussed above,97 one would think that opportunities to 
give direct effect to international custom arise all the time.   As Mr. 
van Ert notes, they almost never arise, because: (1) customary rules 
generally govern state behavior and thus rarely have relevance to 
domestic legal issues; and (2) it is very difficult to prove that a rule 
of custom exists.98  Were it not for the Alien Tort Statute, U.S. 
courts likely would have little reason to ponder the status of 
customary international law as part of our law. 
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Equally instructive is Mr. van Ert’s discussion of the 
Canadian approach to treaties.  Because Canadian courts presume 
that legislation was intended to conform to Canada’s international 
obligations, absent evidence of “unequivocal legislative intention 
to default,” statutes are interpreted with the aid of treaty law.99  As 
a result, despite its seemingly pure dualism, Canada arrives at a 
position not unlike that of the United States’ “last in time,” 
doctrine, in which subsequent legislation trumps treaty obligations 
only if the two cannot be reconciled.  A statute is thus interpreted 
so as to place the United States in violation of its treaty obligations 
only if Congress, in enacting the statute, expressed its clear and 
unequivocal desire to do so.100    
In the final essay in our collection, Zou Keyuan provides a 
sweeping history of the status of international law in China, the 
only non-common-law country addressed in our volume.101  Of the 
countries surveyed, China seems to be closest to the monist model, 
since Chinese law provides that China’s international obligations 
supersede any contrary domestic law.102  However, Chinese 
scholars view the Chinese approach as a modified form of dualism, 
which acknowledges the separate existence of the two types of law 
and does not establish a hierarchical relationship between them.103 
Regardless how one characterizes the Chinese approach on a 
theoretical level, Chinese practice, as described by Professor Zou, 
is exemplary.  When China takes on a new international obligation, 
it implements that obligation through legislation and it alters 
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existing laws and regulations to bring domestic law into 
conformity with the new international standard.104  And, as do 
courts in the U.S. and Canada, Chinese courts interpret statutes 
wherever possible so as to reconcile domestic and international 
law.105 
However, when it comes to the implementation of human 
rights norms, China’s practice is less exemplary.  Professor Zou’s 
extended discussion of the Chinese practice of “re-education 
through labor” (RTL) illustrates one area in which China’s 
domestic policies are not in conformity with international 
standards.  China’s RTL policies do not place it in violation of any 
treaties that it has ratified, but they are inconsistent, says Professor 
Zou, with China’s having signed (but not yet ratified) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and with other 
non-binding human rights declaration to which China is a party.106 
The role of courts in implementing international law in the 
domestic context in China is equally unclear.  Professor Zou 
reports that they have had occasion to do only rarely and their 
practice has been inconsistent.  While some courts have applied 
international law in certain commercial and maritime contexts, 
there is some authority for the position that international human 
rights treaties may not be given direct effect under Chinese law.107   
* 
*            * 
 I began this introductory essay with a discussion of the 
monist and dualist approaches to the question of the incorporation 
of international law as domestic law.  In this area, as in so many 
areas, the Holmesian dictum applies: the life of the law has been 
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not logic but experience.108  Programmatic statements in founding 
documents or in law review articles will not determine the status of 
international law in the domestic context.  It is to be worked out 
through the various legal histories of each state.  As each state 
grapples to reconcile its national legal traditions with its 
international obligations, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the 
experiences of others.  It is our hope that this volume contributes to 
that process. 
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